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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite researchers’ efforts authentication remains a chal-
lenge, as demonstrated by the prevalent use of passwords in
spite of their usability and security problems. Although al-
ternatives have been suggested addressing these problems [1],
they have failed to gain wide acceptance. It is now recog-
nized that a more comprehensive investigation of authenti-
cation schemes is necessary to address the challenge [2].
Research has shown that end-user perceptions and atti-
tudes play a major role in the acceptance of new technolo-
gies [7]. However, they have received limited attention in
the context of authentication [6, 4]. Studies suggest that
authentication schemes are distinct enough to require con-
sideration of a different set of factors, like the perception of
their security. They have also shown that the relationship
between perceived security and acceptance is not linear [6,
4], i.e. up to a certain level of security increases the accept-
ability of a scheme, but beyond that higher levels of security
undermine it. As a higher level of security typically requires
increased user effort, it would seem that a scheme that is
perceived too easy to use may not be acceptable by users.
From the above, it is clear that studying the perception
of their security is an important aspect of a comprehensive
investigation of authentication schemes. In this context, we
conducted a first study of how users perceive the security of
five authentication schemes.
2. STUDY DESIGN
The aim of our study was to see whether schemes with
similar security assessment are perceived differently by users
and to gain some insight on the reasons behind any differ-
ences. The first challenge was to identify the schemes to use,
as there are no widely accepted criteria for the assessment
of authentication schemes [2].
Bonneau et al. have made a first attempt at developing
a set of criteria [1]. They suggest three assessment dimen-
sions, usability, deployability and security. Deployability is
not really relevant for end-users, so we do not consider it
further. Within each dimension there are a number of de-
sirable properties identified. For example, in security there
are properties like resilience to targeted impersonation, ex-
plicit consent, unlinkability, etc. While in usability there
are properties like nothing to carry, infrequent errors, etc.
The assessment is qualitative based on whether a scheme
possesses or not the property. Although the assessment is
coarse-grained, it has been used to assess a wide range of
web authentication schemes. So, we decided to base our
choice of schemes on [1]. We started with passwords due to
their widespread use and selected schemes with similar secu-
rity properties to them. The chosen schemes were Pass-Go,
GrIDSure, Word associations (WA) and Personal knowledge
questions (PKQ) (see [1] for references). They all have re-
silience to theft, no trusted party involvement, explicit con-
sent, and unlinkability, but differ in resilience to targeted
impersonation. Pass-Go and GrIDSure are resilient, pass-
word is somewhat resilient, and PKQ and WA are not. It is
also worth pointing out that our selection includes schemes
from a range of categories; Pass-Go is graphical, GrIDSure
and WA are cognitive, and PKQ is a recovery scheme.
Although passwords and PKQ are widely used, the rest
are not. So, it was essential that participants experience
all schemes. Authentication schemes typically require user
involvement in two stages, registration and authentication,
and for some of them both stages determine the overall se-
curity strength. For example, it is common for passwords
to have registration policies restricting user choice, like a
minimum acceptable length or a requirement to combine
lower and upper case letters, etc. We decided that partic-
ipants should experience both registration and authentica-
tion through a web interface in accordance to [1].
This proved challenging, as the details of their implemen-
tation were not clear in all cases. For example, in PKQ a
range of questions is used in practice [3, 5]. Rabkin has col-
lected and analysed a set of commonly used questions [3].
We used them to drive our implementation. We started
with the question “what is your mother’s maiden name”, as
the “defining” one for the scheme, and the most commonly
used questions. However, the applicability of some of them
was limited. So, we decided to use five questions in total,
three widely applicable ones that were fixed (what is your
mother’s maiden name, your date of birth, your favourite
sport team), while for the other two a choice out of three
was given to participants (what was the name of your first
pet, make of your first car, your childhood hero, and what
is your favourite book/movie/song). Note that selected op-
tions have been assessed similar in security strength [3, 5].
In addition to that participants had to answer a number of
questions, for biographical information, and for each scheme
they had to assess its security using a five point Likert scale
ranging from very insecure to very secure, and could justify
their assessment. We decided to integrate the questions and
the scheme simulations into a single web-based system.
3. STUDY PROCEDURES AND RESULTS
The study was carried out in a computer science labora-
tory at the British University in Egypt. The participants
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Figure 1: The mean security perception scores for
the five schemes.
were all second year students of computer science around
20 years old. There were 42 participants, 27 male and 15
female. Of the 42 responses, 39 were valid for analysis.
Figure 1 shows the mean security perception scores for the
different schemes. Although they are fairly close together
they are indeed different. Looking closer into the data re-
veals that only 9 (approx. 43%) participants assessed the
security of all five schemes the same, in all cases as “Secure”.
Based on the security assessment in [1], one would expect
password to score higher than WA and PKQ, but it does not.
As one would expect, GrIDSure scores higher than PKQ,
WA and password, but also higher than Go-Pass. While
Go-Pass scores higher than WA and password as one would
expect, but surprisingly the same as PKQ. The difference
between schemes was statistically significant as determined
by one-way ANOVA (F (4, 138) = 3.068, p = 0.019). Turkey
HSD analysis indicates that the difference between password
and GrIDSure is statistically significant at p < 0.05. So, we
conclude that the security of schemes with similar security
assessments can in fact be perceived differently by users.
Looking into the comments provided, we observe that
guessability is referred to quite often. This shows that par-
ticipants do appreciate that schemes belong in the “some-
thing you know” category where it is a major issue. Refer-
ences are both positive (e.g. “it is hard for someone to guess
the word you associated”, or “[A Go-Pass pattern] is difficult
to guess”), and negative (e.g. “some passwords are easily
guessed”, or “anyone can guess what the [associated] words
are”), sometimes for the same scheme (WA). We also ob-
serve that personal information is perceived as secure (e.g.
“very personal information is difficult to figure out by [at-
tackers]”, or “[associated words] are very personal and can-
not be expected”). This is in contrast to amassing evidence
to the contrary and indicates a blind spot for the associ-
ated threat. We also observe that familiarity with a scheme
affects its perception, either by being more aware of its weak-
nesses, or by considering it more secure because of its use.
Password falls in the former and this seems the main rea-
son behind its relatively low score (e.g. “a hacker can brute
force [a password]”, or “[it is not secure] as the length of
the password is not specified”). PKQ falls in the latter (e.g.
“allow the user to recover his account if it is hacked”). We
also observe that effort can positively affect the perception
of security (e.g. “[word associations are very secure because
they] take a lot of effort to [register]”, “[word associations
are secure because they] are hard for the user to memorize”,
or “[GrIDSure is secure] as it needs more physical effort”).
At the same time, poor memorability is referred to in poor
assessments (e.g. “[word associations are insecure] because
you can simple forget the words”, or “[Go-Pass is insecure
because] the sequence of colour could be easily forgotten”, or
“[GrIDSure is neither secure or insecure because] it is diffi-
cult for the person to remember”). These results are partly
expected and identify aspects like registration or authenti-
cation mental effort as factors for further exploration.
We should point out that our conclusions above should be
considered with some caution. The number of participants
in our study was not very large, and the group was fairly
homogeneous, in terms of age and educational background.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have carried out a first study of how the security of
password, PKQ, WA, Go-Pass and GrIDSure are perceived
by users. In order to conduct this study we had to address
a number of methodological challenges. From our results
we conclude that the perception of security does not fully
match the reality, and that although guessability is a ma-
jor contributing factor for “something you know” schemes,
it is definitely not the only one, awareness of the potential
threats and effort involved also play a role. In the future,
we plan to investigate gender differences, and different use
contexts like online banking, social networking, etc., as well
as different methodological approaches to explore the rela-
tionship between effort and perceived security.
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